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ABSTRACT 
 
The ubiquitous assertion that the early calculus of Newton and Leibniz was an 
inconsistent theory is examined. Two different objects of a possible inconsistency claim 
are distinguished: (i) the calculus as an algorithm; (ii) proposed explanations of the moves 
made within the algorithm. In the first case the calculus can be interpreted as a theory in 
something like the logician’s sense, whereas in the second case it acts more like a 
scientific theory. I find no inconsistency in the first case, and an inconsistency in the 
second case which can only be imputed to a small minority of the relevant community. 
 
1  Introduction 
2  Berkeley and the Early Calculus 
3  Two Units of Analysis 
4  The Algorithmic Level 
5  The Level of Justification 
   5.1  Newton 
   5.2  Leibniz 
   5.3  The English 
   5.4  The French 
6  Conclusion 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The existence of inconsistencies in mathematical and scientific theories is the 
motivation for several claims in contemporary philosophy of science, including 
the importance of paraconsistent logics to model scientific reasoning. Several 
familiar examples are usually drawn upon to establish such claims. But the 
inconsistency of these theories is rarely if ever rigorously demonstrated, and 
when it is demonstrated it usually follows from a contentious construal of the 
precise theoretical content. What is required is a consensus as to the content of a 
particular theory, and such that a contradiction follows – non-controversially – 
from that content. 
The example here will be the early calculus as introduced by both Newton and 
Leibniz. This has been widely drawn on in the literature to establish that there are 
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many examples of inconsistent theories. Lists of such examples, all of which 
include the early calculus, are to be found in Lakatos (1966, p.59), Feyerabend 
(1978, p.158), Shapere (1984, p.235), Priest and Routley (1983, p.188) and da 
Costa and French (2003, p.84). Both Newton’s ‘calculus of fluxions’ and 
Leibniz’s ‘infinitesimal calculus’ are referred to. But so entrenched is the 
understanding that the early calculus was inconsistent that most authors don’t 
even provide a reference to support the claim. Priest and Routley are an 
exception, citing Boyer’s esteemed history of the calculus: 
 
[circa 1720] mathematicians still felt that the calculus must be interpreted in 
terms of what is intuitively reasonable, rather than of what is logically 
consistent. (Boyer, 1949, p.232) 
 
However, Boyer himself doesn’t provide an argument that the early calculus was 
inconsistent. One is instead led to the words of Bishop George Berkeley, who 
criticised the calculus with his famous 1734 publication The Analyst. 
Is the inconsistency of the early calculus so transparent that Berkeley’s words 
stand as proof of the fact? In this paper I aim to show that one should be very 
careful in distinguishing several different claims Berkeley made. I begin with 
Berkeley in §2, presenting the argument just as he did by way of introduction. In 
§3 I then proceed to analyse the criticisms in more detail, distinguishing two 
principle objects of a possible inconsistency claim. In §4 the first of these is 
discussed, and I argue that it is very natural to call this object ‘the early calculus’. 
But it is noted that this isn’t what most people mean to label ‘inconsistent’, and 
no inconsistency is found. In §5 the second possibility is discussed. This takes us 
on a journey through the commitments of Newton and Leibniz and the 
mathematical communities in England and France following them. Johann 
Bernoulli stands out as a proponent of an inconsistent, even contradictory theory, 
but little significance can be attached to his position. §6 is the conclusion. 
 
 
2. Berkeley and the early calculus 
 
We might imagine Galileo dropping an apple from the top of the tower of Pisa. 
He makes measurements to establish that the relationship between the distance 
travelled s (in metres) and the time taken t (in seconds) is s=5t2. But he finds it 
much harder to measure speed, so he wants to find the speed out mathematically. 
What is the apple’s speed at the precise moment it hits the ground? Galileo could 
draw a graph for s=5t2, then he could find the speed of the apple at any time or 
distance by finding the slope of the tangent to the curve at that time or distance. 
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It’s then obvious how to achieve an excellent approximation to the tangent, and 
thus the speed. Consider the following figure: 
 
 
                   Fig.1 
 
To get an approximation to the tangent at the point (s,t) one can simply take 
another point on the curve, (s`,t+o), and draw a line through the two points. We 
can then reduce o, taking the second point as close as we want to the first point to 
get as good an approximation as we want. However, although this is fine for 
practical purposes, it clearly isn’t much good for achieving an exact result. We 
need two different points to draw a line through, but then we never get the exact 
tangent at a single point. This is the basic problem. 
Newton’s method, applied to this specific case, followed the latter illustration 
rather closely. Taking the two points (s, t) and (s’, t+o) we start with the 
expression, 
 
22 5)(5' totss −+=−  
 
Now we expand the brackets and cancel to give, 
 
2510' otoss +=−  
 
Now the slope of the tangent (and thus the speed) is given on the left hand side 
by dividing through by o (change in distance divided by change in time): 
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o
ss 510' +=−  (Eq.1) 
 
Now we can cancel any remaining terms on the right hand side which contain o, 
and we achieve, 
 
t
o
ss 10' =−      (Eq.2) 
 
which is of course the right answer. 
Clearly the pressing question is, on what grounds do we ‘cancel any remaining 
terms’ in the final step, (Eq.1) to (Eq.2)? The fact that o can be made very small 
doesn’t seem to be good enough, since to cancel these terms it would have to be 
made equal to zero. But it cannot be made equal to zero, since then we would no 
longer be considering two different points on the line. As Berkeley puts it 
(making adjustments for the given example),1
 
Hitherto I have supposed that [t] flows, that [t] hath a real increment, that o is 
something. And I have proceeded all along on that supposition, without 
which I should not have been able to have made so much as one single step. 
From that supposition it is that I get at the increment of [5t2], that I am able 
to compare it with the increment of [t], and that I find the proportion between 
the two increments. I now beg leave to make a new supposition contrary to 
the first, i.e. I will suppose that there is no increment of [t], or that o is 
nothing; which second supposition destroys my first, and is inconsistent with 
it, and therefore with every thing that supposeth it. I do nevertheless beg 
leave to retain [10t], which is an expression obtained in virtue of my first 
supposition, which necessarily presupposeth such supposition, and which 
could not be obtained without it: All which seems a most inconsistent way of 
arguing... (The Analyst, §XIV) 
 
He later mimics the mathematician as follows: 
 
Let me contradict my self: Let me subvert my own Hypothesis: Let me take 
it for granted that there is no Increment, at the same time that I retain a 
                              
1 Berkeley is actually attacking Newton’s ‘theory of fluxions’ here – thus his talk of 
‘flowing’ quantities – but he attacked Leibniz’s ‘differentials’ in just the same way. The 
difference between fluxions and infinitesimals/differentials need not concern us for the 
majority, and will be further explicated in §5, below. 
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Quantity, which I could never have got at but by assuming an Increment.  
(§XXVII) 
 
The charge of inconsistency is then clear enough: o is at first necessarily assumed 
to be something, and then later on assumed to be nothing in order to cancel terms 
which include it. 
Now from a contradiction anything and everything follows, because from the 
premises, 
 
(1) A 
(2) ~A 
 
we may infer from (1), 
 
(3) A v B 
 
where B is any arbitrary statement. And we may infer from (2) and (3), by 
disjunctive syllogism, 
 
(4) B 
 
This demonstrates what is called ECQ, ex contradictione quodlibet, which can be 
roughly translated as ‘from a contradiction everything follows’. This is where the 
paraconsistent logicians step in, because the defining characteristic of a 
paraconsistent logic is that it is not the case that ‘everything follows’ from a 
contradiction. The rules of inference used above are doctored in one way or 
another. However, before we resort to meddling with logic we may well ask 
precisely what counts as the ‘A’ in the early calculus, such that we have ‘A&~A’. 
Indeed, what is ‘the calculus’ here? 
 
 
3. Two Units of Analysis 
 
The obvious candidate for ‘A’ is that ‘o is something’, meaning that o is a non-
zero quantity or number. However, we might ask whether this assumption is 
really part of the calculus. Certainly at the beginning of the procedure one 
manipulates the equations as if o is something, then at the end one drops certain 
terms as if o is nothing. But as a ‘bare procedure’ the claim that o first is 
something and then later is nothing need not accompany the calculus. And 
surprisingly enough, in the early days the calculus really was widely taken as a 
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‘bare procedure’, an algorithm, a set of steps to be followed without 
accompanying justification. 
The motive for delineating the calculus in this way comes directly from the 
primary literature. Newton and Leibniz, acting independently of course, both 
adopted this instrumentalist attitude in the majority of their publications, with 
only marginal comments on what might be called interpretation, explanation or 
justification. As Kitcher writes,2
 
Newton typically expressed his algorithms in the form of a set of instructions 
to the reader. (1973, p.37) 
 
The first sign of Newton’s calculus in print was the Principia (1687). As Boyer 
writes: 
 
His contribution was that of facilitating the operations, rather than of 
clarifying the conceptions. As Newton himself admitted in this work 
[Principia], his method is “shortly explained, rather than accurately 
demonstrated.” … [M]athematics was a method rather than an explanation. 
(Boyer, 1949, p.193) 
 
And his De Quadratura (1704) had a similarly instrumental flavour, as Kitcher 
writes: 
 
It is unclear whether there is any evidence of Newton asking himself what o 
denotes (ie, what an infinitesimal is). Indeed, in the light of his De 
Quadratura with its instrumentalist attitude toward infinitesimals, the 
question would seem to be meaningless for him. (1973, p.42f.) 
 
And his De Analysi (1711) begins by stating the methodological rules of the 
calculus, without justification, before going on to present various examples 
(Edwards, 1979, p.201). Turning to Leibniz I quote Mancosu (1996, p.151), who 
writes of Leibniz’s first publication of the calculus (1684), 
 
The paper is remarkable for the paucity of the explanations given by 
Leibniz… Leibniz does not explain how he arrived at his equations and 
leaves the reader totally in the dark as to the heuristics and formal proofs of 
the results therein presented. 
 
                              
2 See Kitcher’s paper for some primary evidence. 
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He continues (p.153), “In 1684 Leibniz has presented without justification the … 
rules for the calculus.” 
Of course both of the founders did spend some time attempting to justify their 
procedures, but these ‘justifications’ both can be distinguished from the 
procedures and were so distinguished at the time. And not just by the founders 
but by the communities following them. As Kitcher writes, 
 
The mathematical community had appreciated the power of Newtonian and 
Leibnizian techniques, and had shelved worries about the explanation of their 
success. (1983, p.256)3
 
When textbooks started to emerge in England, the distinction was clear: 
 
All these treatises, however advanced they may have been, did not introduce 
the student to the calculus as a theory […], but rather explained to him how 
to employ in geometry and mechanics a set of rules. (Guicciardini, p.58f.) 
 
Today we might wonder how the lack of justification could have been acceptable 
to the community, but it is perhaps difficult to appreciate just how revolutionary 
the calculus was at that time. Before Newton and Leibniz there had been just a 
handful of disparate techniques for solving what were really calculus problems. 
Now, with the new algorithm, an infinity of previously intractable problems were 
made accessible, and the calculus produced success after success. In this 
environment, the founders were able to present the calculus without explaining 
why it worked. 
This distinction between the calculus as an algorithm and the justification of 
the calculus is already prevalent in historical and philosophical literature. Back in 
1869 Bauman was to write, 
 
Thus we discard the logical and metaphysical justification which Leibniz 
gave to the calculus, but we decline to touch the calculus itself. (Cited in 
Lakatos, 1966, p.58) 
 
Russell wrote in terms of ‘interpreting the infinitesimal calculus’ in 1948, and 
compares the distinction to that between elementary arithmetic and the definition 
of the natural numbers (Ibid., p.58). Lakatos emphasises the distinction, 
                              
3 Cf. Bos, 1980, p.80: “Most mathematicians spend most of their time not in 
contemplating these concepts and methods, but in using them to solve problems.” See 
also Grabiner, 1983, p.197, for a striking example of this attitude in the work of Fermat. 
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describing it as ‘metaphysical versus technical’ and ‘instrument versus 
interpretation’.4 Edwards is typical in referring to the early calculus as “a 
powerful algorithmic instrument for systematic calculation.” (1979, p.190). 
Kitcher is yet more explicit in distinguishing “the algorithmic level” from the 
level of justification (1973, pp.36-37 and §4).5 And the same distinction is 
central to Chemla’s paper on early Chinese mathematics, as the title suggests: 
‘The Interplay Between Proof and Algorithm in 3rd Century China: The 
Operation as Prescription of Computation and the Operation as Argument’ 
(Chemla, 2005). 
Berkeley himself nearly always referred to the calculus as the ‘method of 
fluxions’, and occasionally as the ‘algorithm of fluxions’ (Lavine, 1994, p.25). 
Indeed, he noted the distinction in question here, writing, “It appears that his 
[Newton’s] Followers have shewn themselves more eager in applying his 
Method, than accurate in examining his Principles.” (The Analyst, §XVII). But 
then, taken purely as an algorithm, the two contradictory assumptions Berkeley 
focuses on are external to the calculus. They are (proposed) justifications for 
moves made within the algorithm, rather than part of the algorithm itself. So we 
might well conclude that Berkeley himself didn’t really mean to label the 
calculus inconsistent, but instead the explanation of it. 
We will see in §5 that it is not even clear that any justifications actually 
proposed were inconsistent, and that it is far from clear that there is anything we 
would want to call an inconsistent theory. However, it is first important to argue 
that the ‘calculus itself’, as an algorithm, is not an inconsistent object. 
 
 
4. The Algorithmic Level 
 
Is the ‘calculus itself’ even the kind of thing which could be inconsistent? I think 
it is. First, we need to get clearer on what is meant by the ‘bare algorithm’.6 It 
can be represented as a conditional proposition, as follows: 
 
If, for any function y=f(x), we calculate 
o
xfoxf )()( −+
, where o acts as 
a numerical constant, and then take away any remaining terms which are 
multiples of o, then we are left with the derivative. 
                              
4 Lakatos himself rejects the distinction, but if his arguments are successful at all they 
need only persuade us to accept that the distinction sometimes breaks down. 
5 Cf. Grabiner (1983, p.16), Bos (1980, p.60), Guicciardini (1989, p.38). 
6 In what follows I focus purely on the example given in §2, as paradigmatic. Certainly 
this is the focus of Berkeley’s objections. 
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We see how this is the kind of thing which could be inconsistent if we make a 
comparison with the axiom scheme for induction in Peano arithmetic.7 In words 
we have: 
 
If, for any formula A(x), A(0) holds and for all x if A(x) holds then A(x+1) 
holds, then A(x) holds for all x. 
 
Notice how in the latter case, just as the former, there is no accompanying 
explanation for why the consequent holds when the antecedent does. Rather, it 
stands as a hypothesis, which can be tested by applying different formulas A(x). 
Now the axioms of Peano arithmetic would be deemed inconsistent if a 
contradiction followed from them. Similarly we may ask whether a contradiction 
follows from the calculus. But in mathematics by ‘contradiction’ we don’t need 
to find an ‘A&~A’; it is acceptable to label ‘2=1’ a contradiction, for example.8 
So in fact we might call the calculus inconsistent if it gives us even a single false 
result. To give an example, consider the following equality: 
 
...
9
1
7
1
5
1
3
11
4
−+−+−=π  
 
This equation was derived by Leibniz with the use of his calculus. Now if the 
calculus had led to something slightly different, so that it followed that π>4, then 
we would have a contradiction. We get ~π>4 ‘for free’, so to speak, from the 
meanings of the symbols in play. 
But in fact the early calculus was not inconsistent in this sense – it never did 
give a wrong result. Certainly Berkeley was happy to admit this, writing that 
“Analysts arrive at truth”. His objection was rather that they didn’t know how 
they arrived at truth (§XXII). Many no doubt saw this as charitable, since some 
did see utter falsehoods as following from the early calculus. But in fact such 
falsehoods only follow once we add to the ‘bare’ calculus some justificational 
assumptions. For example, consider the following calculation: 
 
(i) x+o=x 
(ii) x+2o=x+o 
                              
7 See Boolos et al, 2003, p.214. As briefly noted in §2, Russell also makes a comparison 
between modern arithmetic and the early calculus. 
8 The contradiction follows from the meanings of ‘1’, ‘=’ and ‘2’. I am considering the 
calculus as an interpreted proposition here, so the comparison is really with Peano 
arithmetic as interpreted. 
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(iii) 2o=o 
(iv) 2=1 
 
Equation (i) seems to follow from the calculus, since at the final stage of the 
procedure one drops all terms which are multiples of o (in the example in §2, 
recall, it appears from the final step that 10t+5o=10t). (ii), (iii) and (iv) then 
follow from natural application of the algebraic laws, and one reaches the 
absurdity (contradiction) that 2=1. Has this then followed from the calculus? Not 
if the calculus is the bare algorithm suggested here. One might well object that 
the terms multiplied by o can be dropped only in the context of the procedure. 
Berkeley was certainly willing to accept this, since he made no such objection. 
Others were not so charitable. Rolle, in the early 1700s in France, claimed to 
be able to prove that o=0, and also that the calculus led to mistakes. However, the 
calculation leading to o=0 stepped outside the accepted algorithm, as (i)-(iv) do, 
and the alleged mistakes were shown to follow from mistaken application (see 
§5.4, below). The calculus stood up to the challenge in every case; no 
mathematical falsehoods followed from the application of the algorithm. 
 
 
5. The Level of Justification 
 
If the calculus had given rise to a false result, then that might have been labelled 
a logical falsehood, in comparison with ‘2=1’, and thus a contradiction. But of 
course this isn’t the reason why the calculus has been widely labelled 
‘inconsistent’. What is really meant, following Berkeley, is that there is an 
inconsistency at the level of justification. The most obvious explanation of the 
moves made within the algorithm is inconsistent: o is necessarily taken to be 
something, and then at the final step it is taken to be nothing. But to be involved 
in a calculation at all o must be a quantity or a numerical constant, and therefore 
must remain the same throughout the calculation. Therefore, o appears to have 
contradictory properties, regardless of whether we give it a suggestive name like 
‘infinitesimal’. 
This explanation certainly is inconsistent. However, if nobody genuinely 
proposed this explanation, then of what interest is it? What is surely required for 
an inconsistent theory to be of significance for the history and philosophy of 
science is a significant commitment to that theory. We can of course invent an 
inconsistent explanation of any method in science or mathematics, but this won’t 
be of any philosophical interest, since nobody would sign up to it; everyone 
would sign up to a consistent explanation instead. But if there was no known 
consistent explanation, what then? This certainly wouldn’t mean that everyone 
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then signed up to the inconsistent explanation. It would rather mean that they 
didn’t have any explanation, or that they only had an inadequate or incoherent 
explanation. 
In this section I will be on the lookout for the latter three possibilities. When 
we look to the relevant individuals and communities with whom we associate the 
early calculus, did they indeed have inconsistent explanations, or did they rather 
have (a) no explanation at all, (b) an inadequate explanation, or (c) an incoherent 
explanation? Just because the most obvious explanation of the moves made 
within the procedure of the calculus is inconsistent should not mean that it counts 
as a default. For it to count there must be the appropriate commitment, just as we 
would expect for any theory or belief system. 
So in sum the job of this section is to ask, did the relevant individual or 
community sign up to infinitesimals with their contradictory properties or 
not? Evidence that they did not will take two forms: (1) an explicit rejection 
of infinitesimals, and (2) attempts at an alternative justification. 
 
 
5.1 Newton 
 
In §3, above, I was keen to note that Newton presented the calculus as an 
algorithm, without any concomitant justification. This picture satisfies the 
majority of Newton’s work on the calculus, but there are small but 
important passages where Newton does turn to justification. Prima facie it 
looks like Newton presents three different justifications, one in terms of 
‘infinitesimals’, another in terms of ‘fluxions’, and a third in terms of 
‘primary and ultimate ratios’ (Boyer, p.219). We might ask whether any of 
these are candidates for Berkeley’s objections. 
Of course in the search for inconsistency our attention turns to the 
infinitesimal justifications. Boyer for one has written that, 
 
Berkeley’s objection to Newton’s infinitesimal conceptions as self-
contradictory was quite pertinent. (1949, p.226) 
 
However, today there is a consensus in the literature that Newton’s 
explanation of the calculus was much more sophisticated than this would 
suggest. Here is a taster: 
 
The common answer of the fluxionists was that Berkeley’s logical criticism 
was applicable only to the differential method, which was employed by 
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Newton merely to abbreviate the proofs. Newton’s genuine method was the 
method of limits. (Guicciardini, 1989, p.44) 
 
[The criticisms were] uncharitable. Berkeley’s reading presupposes the 
unfavourable interpretation of the argument. (Kitcher, 1983, p.239, fn.15) 
 
[Berkeley’s] criticism may be a bit unfair to Newton, who can, as we have 
seen, be read as having some idea of using something like limits to replace 
the procedure of setting o equal to zero. (Lavine, 1994, p.24) 
 
This consensus arises for various reasons. Certainly important are the fact 
that in Newton’s first two published works using the calculus (Principia, 
1687; De Quadratura, 1704) disclaimers tell us not to take talk of 
infinitesimals too seriously: 
 
Those ultimate ratios with which quantities vanish are not truly the ratio of 
ultimate quantities, but limits towards which the ratios of quantities 
decreasing without limit do always converge; and to which they approach 
nearer than by any given difference, but never go beyond, nor in effect attain 
to, till the quantities are diminished in infinitum. (Newton, Principia – cited 
in Edwards, 1979, p.225) 
 
Citing another passage from the beginning of the Principia, and a passage from 
the introduction to De Quadratura, Edwards writes, 
 
In other words, Newton says, exposition in terms of indivisibles or 
infinitesimals is simply a convenient shorthand (but not a substitute) for 
rigorous mathematical proof in terms of ultimate ratios (limits). (1979, p.226, 
see also Kitcher, 1973) 
 
Of course, Newton never gave such a rigorous proof, at least by modern 
standards. But then we should impute to him an inadequate explanation. Talk of 
infinitesimals is then just shorthand for this inadequate explanation. 
Berkeley himself noted a passage in Newton’s De Quadratura which said that, 
“errors are not to be disregarded in mathematics, no matter how small.” However, 
instead of assuming that the final stage in the procedure was shorthand for 
something else, Berkeley saw Newton as breaking his own rule here. Newton is 
to blame to some extent; his actual justification in terms of the limits of ratios 
wasn’t quite clear enough, nor was it very clear, perhaps, that this was his actual 
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justification. But he was at least clear enough that we cannot impute to him 
Berkeley’s blatantly contradictory justification. 
 
 
5.2 Leibniz 
 
Leibniz had faced his own Berkeley in the 1690s in the form of Nieuwentijdt. 
Although this was altogether a quieter affair, Leibniz was indeed moved to clarify 
his position on infinitesimals. The consensus today is that Leibniz, much like 
Newton, had a more sophisticated position than his critics recognised. 
Right from his first publication on the calculus it is clear that Leibniz was 
concerned to avoid infinitesimals with their apparently contradictory properties. 
Whereas an extant draft of his Nova Methodus of 1684 speaks of infinitesimals, 
these have been removed in the published version (Mancosu, 1989, p.229; cf. 
Bos, 1974, p.62ff.). By 1689 he was corresponding with Johann Bernoulli (who 
we will meet in §5.4), arguing squarely against the thesis that infinitesimals 
‘exist’. Indeed it is clear that he, as Newton, has something like limits on his 
mind: 
 
For if we suppose that there actually exist the segments on the line that are to 
be designated by ½, ¼, …, and that all the members of this sequence actually 
exist, you conclude from this that an infinitely small member must also exist. 
In my opinion, however, the assumption implies nothing but the existence of 
any finite fraction of arbitrary smallness. (Cited in Rescher, 1955, p.113) 
  
This attitude continues in 1701, when he wrote, 
 
[I]nstead of the infinite or the infinitely small, one takes quantities as large, 
or as small, as necessary in order that the error be smaller than the given 
error. (Cited in Bos, 1974, p.56) 
 
And looking back in 1716 Leibniz wrote, 
 
When they [our friends] were disputing in France with Abbé Gallois, Fr. 
Gouge and others, I assured them that I didn’t at all believe that there are 
quantities which are truly infinitesimal. (Cited in Mancosu, 1989, p.237) 
 
It therefore seems fair to say that Leibniz used infinitesimals as ‘meaningless 
symbols’ (Bos, 1980, p.87). His real justification for the calculus was something 
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more like Newton. On occasion he appealed to what he called the ‘principle of 
continuity’: 
 
In any supposed continuous transition, ending in any terminus, it is 
permissible to institute a general reasoning, in which the final terminus may 
also be included. (In Horvath, 1986, p.67) 
 
But for the most part he simply used the calculus, discovering impressive new 
equalities like the one given above for π/4. What justificatory beliefs he did have 
were perhaps inadequate or to some extent incoherent, but surely not 
inconsistent. 
 
We see at this point, then, that we cannot associate an inconsistent theory with 
either of the two founders of the calculus. However, this need not overly perturb 
those who believe the early calculus is inconsistent. Their claims will still be 
highly significant if it can be established that there was a significant community 
which held to an inconsistent theory. It is to the two most relevant mathematical 
communities we now turn, the English and the French. 
 
 
5.3 The English 
 
English thought in the early years of the calculus can, broadly speaking, be split 
into two different periods: before and after Berkeley’s Analyst of 1734. Before 
this time there appears to have been very little if any consensus on the 
foundations. It just was the case that the calculus could be applied as a method, 
an instrument to get interesting results and do calculations which had been very 
difficult or impossible up until that point. Thus the development of the calculus 
throughout this period was “almost automatic”, as Boyer has put it (1949, p.243). 
There was much to be done with the calculus without worrying about why it 
worked. 
When thoughts did occasionally turn to justification and explanation opinions 
were varied. Here one possible source of confusion was the publication, in 1711, 
of Newton’s De Analysi. No wonder that Newton’s development of thought was 
lost on many, since this was Newton’s last publication on the calculus (in his 
lifetime), but displays some of his earliest thoughts, being written as it was 
around 1669. Here there is less discussion in terms of fluxions or prime and 
ultimate ratios, and more talk of the “infinitely small” (Boyer, pp.191,193f.; 
Lavine, p.16f.). 
 14
Another factor is Raphson’s The History of Fluxions (1715), which confused 
fluxions with moments9, and clearly considers Newton’s fluxion theory to be just 
the same thing as Leibniz’s differential calculus. There is no care given to 
definitions or foundations (Boyer, p.222). And in Stone’s 1730 translation of 
l’Hôpital’s textbook of 1696, fluxions and differentials are taken to be the same 
thing. According to Guicciardini, “equating fluxions and differentials was a 
common practice in this early period; and this created a great confusion in the 
terminology of early fluxionists.” (1989, p.41). 
Thus Lavine considers Berkeley’s 1735 summary of the state of play to have 
been “pretty fair”: 
 
Some fly to proportions between nothings. Some reject quantities because 
infinitesimal. Others allow only finite quantities and reject them because 
inconsiderable. Others place the method of fluxions on a foot with that of 
exhaustions, and admit nothing new therein. Some maintain a clear 
conception of fluxions. Others hold they can demonstrate about things 
incomprehensible. Some would prove the algorithm of fluxions by reduction 
ad absurdum; others a priori. Some hold the evanescent increments to be real 
quantities, some to be nothings, some to be limits. As many men, so many 
minds… Some insist the conclusions are true, and therefore the principles… 
Lastly several … frankly owned the objections to be unanswerable. (Cited in 
Lavine, 1994, p.25) 
 
If this is a fair representation, then even if one position or another was 
inconsistent, we would be hard pushed to attach any significance to that position. 
After 1734 there was increased debate on the foundations in an attempt to 
quash Berkeley’s attack. A guiding influence here must have been the publication 
in 1736 of Newton’s Methodus Fluxionum, espousing the method and 
terminology of fluxions. This was actually written some years before De 
Quadratura, but the significance of this seems to have been lost on the 
mathematical community at that time (Newton was no longer available to clarify, 
having died in 1727). The method and terminology of fluxions gradually took 
hold, and with it an explanation of the success of the calculus in terms of 
kinematics.  
This position is summed up by the following quotation by Newton from 1693: 
 
                              
9 Newton, 1714: “Fluxions and moments are quantities of a different kind. Fluxions are 
finite motions, moments are infinitely little parts.” (Kitcher, 1973, p.40) 
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I don’t here consider mathematical quantities as composed of parts extremely 
small, but as generated by a continual motion. 
 
So when trying to find the tangent at a point on a curved line, one should imagine 
a particle traversing such a line. The speed of the particle is then separated into its 
x and y components, such that we have dx/dt and dy/dt. One then considers a 
‘moment’ of time o (infinitesimal in length), and the distance travelled by the 
particle in the x and y directions in that time, which are given by, 
 
o
dt
dx
  and  o
dt
dy
. 
 
One then reaches the derivative via the following equation:10
 
dx
dt
dt
dy
x
y
dx
dy == &
&
 
 
Of course infinitesimals were still used, in a sense, but now they were 
infinitesimal moments in time. The explanation was meant to follow from the fact 
that the continuous flow of time is, in some sense, intuitive. As Boyer writes, 
 
This concept [the continuous flow of time] Newton seems to have felt was 
sufficiently impelling and so clearly known through intuition as to make 
further definition unnecessary. (1949, p.194) 
 
Significantly, this explanation of the calculus was rife in the 1736 publication, 
just two years after The Analyst, and at a time of some concern vis-à-vis the 
foundations. It is no coincidence that in 1742 the most involved book on the 
foundations of the calculus at that time attempted to provide an axiomatic 
approach to the continuity of time and motion. This was Maclaurin’s Treatise of 
Fluxions. Around this time a great number of textbooks were emerging on the 
calculus, and Maclaurin played a part in all of them. Guicciardini writes, 
 
In all these textbooks the reader was introduced in a preface or first chapter 
to the kinematic meaning of the concepts of the calculus; here Maclaurin was 
followed as the authority on these foundational aspects. (1989, p.59) 
 
                              
10 In fact, although this looks rather different, the method is similar to that given above, in 
§2. See Kitcher, 1973, p.43f. 
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Is fluxion theory an inconsistent theory? Certainly ‘indivisible moments of 
time’ remained a central part of the theory, but the community made it clear that 
these were meant to be something different to infinitesimals. As Guicciardini 
writes, 
 
Since 1742 [Maclaurin] almost all the fluxionists accepted Maclaurin’s 
rejection of infinitesimals. (p.51) 
 
In making their distinction between infinitesimals and ‘moments’ they could also 
draw on Newton, who wrote in De Quadratura, 
 
I have sought to demonstrate that in the method of fluxions it is not necessary 
to introduce into geometry infinitely small figures. (Boyer, p.202) 
 
It’s not quite clear that this distinction solves the problems, though. The 
‘moments’ appear to have contradictory properties just as the infinitesimals do. 
Kitcher has argued that, 
 
[T]he infinitesimal linelet is just Newton’s “moment” of a fluxion… The 
methods involving fluxions are supported by infinitesimal justifications. 
(1973, p.40) 
 
Indeed, Kitcher argues that fluxions do not represent justification at all, but rather 
remain at ‘the algorithmic level’. 
This may have been Newton’s conception of fluxions, but I maintain that there 
were many who did see fluxions as justificatory. Contrary to the ‘static’ 
infinitesimals, much was made of the fact that in the terminology of fluxions 
quantities ‘flowed’, and the passage of time was meant to play a central role. 
Compare James Jurin in his reply to Berkeley: 
 
Not too fast Good Mr. Logician. If I say, the increments now exist, and the 
increments do not now exist; the latter assertion will be contrary to the 
former, supposing now to mean the same instant of time in both assertions. 
But if I say at one time, the increments now exist; and say an hour after, the 
increments do not now exist; the latter assertion will neither be contrary, nor 
contradictory to the former, because the first now signifies one time, and the 
second now signifies another time, so that both assertions may be true. 
(Guicciardini, 1989, p.173f.) 
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In this passage it looks like the ‘moments’ themselves are considered to change, 
from something to nothing, even as the calculation progresses! That this sort of 
position was widely credited and taken on board by others is evidenced by the 
fact that Buffon referred to Jurin as “solid, brilliant, admirable.” (Boyer, p.246). 
Are we then to label this sort of position inconsistent? What is required, to 
repeat, is the derivation of a contradiction from what can be idenitifed as a set of 
widely accepted assumptions. In fact, there is some evidence that even Berkeley 
did not see an inconsistent position here, but instead a confused one. Several 
passages in The Analyst refer to “confusion”, “obscurity” and “incomprehensible 
metaphysics” (e.g. §XLIX). 
If a representative inconsistent theory can be reconstructed, little significance 
can be attached to it. On the main part, even after 1734, there was very little 
concern with the foundations of the calculus. Many textbooks appealed to 
Maclaurin, as noted, but it isn’t even clear that the writers of these textbooks had 
read his Treatise of Fluxions. It has been written that Maclaurin was “praised by 
all, read by none.” (Grabiner, 1997, p.394). Again, the real work was considered 
to be the use of the calculus. Here I repeat the quotation from Guicciardini, 1989: 
 
All these treatises, however advanced they may have been, did not introduce 
the student to the calculus as a theory […], but rather explained to him how 
to employ in geometry and mechanics a set of rules. (p.58f.) 
 
In fact Lavine writes that in 1741 lack of rigor was widely considered to be 
a virtue (1994, p.25f.). It was written at that time, 
 
But the tables have turned. All reasoning concerned with what common 
sense knows in advance, serves only to conceal the truth and to weary the 
reader and is today disregarded. (Ibid.) 
 
With this attitude in place we cannot expect to find inconsistency at the 
explanatory level in any meaningful sense. 
 
 
5.4 The French 
 
The most obvious source for an inconsistency claim lies with the French 
community. Following Leibniz’s publication of 1684 a group of mathematicians 
arose which are sometimes referred to as the ‘French infinitesimalists’. They are 
usually characterised as united in their belief in the existence of infinitesimals. As 
Mancosu writes, 
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This belief in the existence of infinitesimals was common to all the French 
infinitesimalists and they shared it with (and probably got it from) Johann (I) 
Bernoulli. (1989, p.234) 
 
 Here, then, lies a candidate for Berkeley’s inconsistent theory of the calculus. 
Within this community the following names are usually mentioned: Johann 
Bernoulli, Jakob Bernoulli, l’Hôpital, Malebranche, Varignon, Fontenelle, 
Saurin, Carré, Montmort, Guisnée and Grandi. However, we certainly should not 
equate the French community with the infinitesimalists. As Mancosu (1989) 
writes, in the first decade of the 18th century “a bitter debate raged for about 6 
years” within the Academy of Sciences of Paris. The opposing force was made 
up of Rolle, Ph. de la Hire, Galloys and Gouye, and to some extent Leibniz 
himself.11 We might also note that many of the ‘infinitesimalists’ wrote little or 
nothing on the foundations of the calculus, and thus are fairly described as 
merely paying lip-service to infinitesimals. So already we are reduced to 
analysing the foundational claims of but a few individuals. And in fact, as we 
will see, it is far from clear that even these central figures signed up to Berkeley’s 
inconsistent theory. 
I take for example Jakob Bernoulli. Edwards writes,  
 
[W]hereas Leibniz himself was somewhat circumspect regarding the actual 
existence of infinitesimals, this appropriate caution was generally not shared 
by his immediate followers (such as the Bernoulli brothers), who uncritically 
accepted infinitesimals as genuine mathematical entities. (1979, p.265) 
 
However, Jakob should not be bracketed together with his younger brother in this 
way. At times Jakob certainly was critical of infinitesimals – on at least one 
occasion he rejected infinitesimals outright, stating that a quantity smaller than 
any given magnitude is zero (Boyer, p.240). At other times he did appear to 
commit to infinitesimals (Boyer, p.240; Mancosu, p.238), but the fact that he 
vacillated surely reduces his significance within the community. 
Secondly I turn to Varignon. He is particularly important, since during the 
‘bitter debate’ at the beginning of the 18th century Varignon stepped up for the 
                              
11 Fontenelle wrote of Leibniz in 1716, “An architect constructed a building which was so 
audacious that even he didn’t dare to live in it; and there are people who are more 
convinced of its solidity than he as, and who live in it without fear and, what is more, 
without accident.” (Cited in Mancosu, p.237). 
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infinitesimalists, as a representative, to defend their position. Rolle provided the 
familiar objections: 
 
A quantity + or – its differential is made equal to the very same quantity, 
which is the same thing as saying that the part is equal to the whole… 
Sometimes the differentials are used as nonzero quantities and sometimes as 
absolute zeros. (Mancosu, p.230) 
 
However, instead of defending the inconsistent properties of infinitesimals, 
Varignon rejected the suggestion that infinitesimals were constant quantities at 
all. He wrote to Leibniz in 1701, 
 
The Abbé Galloys, who is really behind the whole thing, is spreading the 
report here [in Paris] that you have explained that you mean by the 
“differential” or the “infinitely small” a very small, but nevertheless constant 
and definite, quantity… I, on the other hand, have called a thing infinitely 
small, or the differential of a quantity, if that quantity is inexhaustible in 
comparison with the thing. (Cited in Boyer, 1968, p.475) 
 
As Boyer writes at this point, “The view that Varignon expressed here is far from 
clear, but at least he recognized that a differential is a variable rather than a 
constant.” (Ibid.).  
The view of differentials as variable quantities bears more than a passing 
resemblance to Newton’s ‘flowing moments’. Surprisingly enough, in an effort to 
prove that infinitesimals exist, Varignon turned directly to Newton’s fluxions and 
an explanation in terms of kinematics (Mancosu, p.231). In fact, he “appealed to 
Newton’s Principia as the source for a rigorous foundation of the calculus.” 
(Ibid.). At one stage he even gives an explanation reminiscent of Newton’s 
ultimate ratios, citing infinitesimals as “infinitely changing until zero”. He goes 
on, 
 
[T]hey (the differentials) are always real and subdivisible to infinity, until in 
the end they have completely ceased to exist; and that is the only point at 
which they change into absolutely nothing. (Ibid.)12
 
                              
12 Cf. Cauchy, 1821: “When the successive numerical values of a variable decrease 
indefinitely so as to become smaller than any given number, this variable becomes what 
is called an infinitesimal, or infinitely small quantity.” (Cited in Lakatos, 1966, p.48) 
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Within this web of ‘incomprehensible metaphysics’, as Berkeley might have put 
it, one thing is clear: Varignon is concerned to show that the inconsistency claim 
is not relevant to his position. So if Varignon is representative of the 
infinitesimalists, this community is also not guilty of committing to the 
inconsistent justification put forward by Berkeley. And he does seem to be 
representative – that the majority of the community took differentials to be 
variable rather than fixed quantities is stressed by Bos (1974, p.17). For example, 
in 1710 Leibniz wrote, “[T]he quantity dx itself is not always constant, but 
usually increases or decreases continually.” (Ibid.).13
Finally I turn to Johann Bernoulli, arguably the key proponent of the existence 
of infinitesimals as genuine entities. We saw in §5.2 that he argued with Leibniz 
in 1689 that infinitesimals exist, and by 1691 he had written an essay on the 
‘differential calculus’. The very first line of this essay delivers the following 
postulate: 
 
1. A quantity, which is diminished or increased by an infinitely small 
quantity, is neither diminished nor increased.14
 
To repeat: A quantity which is increased is not increased. Certainly here 
Bernoulli appears to have embraced contradiction. So here, finally, we have a 
candidate for the inconsistency claim. But does it only pertain to a single 
individual? 
We must ask whether Bernoulli had any followers who explicitly took on 
board his contradictory justification. But in fact Bernoulli’s ‘Postulate 1’ was 
known only to one individual, the Marquis de l’Hôpital. By 1691 Bernoulli had 
entered into a contract with the Marquis whereby it was agreed that, for a 
handsome sum, Bernoulli would communicate all his ideas directly to l’Hôpital 
and nobody else. So Bernoulli wasn’t allowed to publish his Postulate!15 The 
postulate does come to light in 1696 in l’Hopital’s famous textbook of 1696, 
Analyse des infiniment petits, but now in a slightly weaker form. L’Hôpital 
writes, 
 
                              
13 Mancosu writes, “dx functioned as a numerical constant, and, interpreting it as a 
process, Varignon’s approach created an asymmetry, an incongruity, between the 
formalism and its referents.” (1989, p.235). So we might say that the justfication is 
inconsistent with the application, but it certainly doesn’t follow that the justification itself 
is inconsistent. 
14 “1. Eine Größe, die vermindert oder vermehrt wird um eine unendlich kleinere Größe, 
wird weder vermindert noch vermehrt.” (Bernoulli, J. 1924 [1691/2]). 
15 For more on this relationship see Bos, 1980, pp.52 and 73. 
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Grant that two quantities, whose difference is an infinitely small quantity, 
may be taken (or used) indifferently for each other: or (which is the same 
thing) that a quantity, which is increased or decreased only by an infinitely 
small quantity, may be considered as remaining the same. (Mancosu, p.227) 
 
The emphasis on use is certainly intentional; l’Hopital himself had very little 
concern for foundations. As Boyer writes, “l’Hôpital did not in this book discuss 
the nature of the basic concepts of the calculus.” (p.238). The textbook may have 
been remarkably popular, being reprinted in 1715, 1720, 1768 and 1781, and 
translated into English in 1730. But certainly we cannot conclude from this that 
Bernoulli’s justification had a following. 
What of the rest of the French infinitesimalists? Is it fair to present them as 
merely paying lip-service to infinitesimals, and as not even having a ‘theory of 
the calculus’ in any significant sense? What of the “final victory of the 
infinitesimal calculus” over its critics in 1707 (Mancosu, p.243)? What must be 
noted here is that by this time the battle had turned from justificatory issues to 
issues of application. Rolle now claimed that the new calculus led to mistakes 
and he brought forth example after example in an attempt to show this. Sadly for 
him, in every case it was shown that the new calculus did give the right answer, 
and that Rolle had made a mistake in applying it (Mancosu, pp.232-240). With 
this strategy in place there is little wonder that pressure mounted up against 
Rolle. In the face of the common threat, those who had justificatory concerns but 
no concerns over application (such as Leibniz) naturally merged with those who 
had no concerns of justification or application. Thus it is a shame that Rolle 
didn’t take Berkeley’s attitude, accepting that “Analysts arrive at truth” and 
focusing on the foundations. In this way the French community might have been 
pushed to clarify things a little further. As it happened, the ‘victory’ of 1707 was 
a victory of application, a victory of terminology and method, but not really a 
victory of justification. Leibniz for one still had his doubts, but by this stage he 
had squarely placed himself in the infinitesimal camp, and put foundational 
questions to one side. 
There is clearly more to be said here, but I think I’ve said enough to severely 
reduce the significance of the claim that the early calculus was inconsistent. For 
starters, during the most significant period of foundational disputation the French 
community was sharply divided. But then even within the infinitesimal camp 
there was division, between those who apparently took infinitesimals to be 
constant quantities (Johann Bernoulli) and those who took them to be variables 
(Varignon). Bos (1974) seems to suggest that the majority sided with Varignon. 
And it goes without saying that even Johann Bernoulli was much more concerned 
with application than justification. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Johann Bernoulli’s theory of the calculus was, perhaps, inconsistent. But can we 
impute this same theory to the rest of the French infinitesimalists? Varignon 
provides the prime example of how one can ‘believe that infinitesimals exist’, 
and thus be an ‘infinitesimalist’, without being subject to Berkeley’s 
inconsistency claim. In addition there were several within the French community 
who rejected infinitesimals as genuine entities, including Leibniz. Taking a still 
wider perspective, we can say that the inconsistency claim also falls short with 
the English community and Newton in particular. It should surely be noted, then, 
that very little significance can be attached to any claim that the early calculus 
was an inconsistent theory. 
In addition one may focus on the word ‘theory’ here, and question whether 
Bernoulli’s position is really an inconsistent theory. At the level of justification 
‘theory’ is being used to mean something like ‘explanation’. But it is hard to 
accept that the blatant contradiction Bernoulli puts forward can even count as an 
explanation. Even those who have defended the possibility of ‘Believing the Self-
Contradictory’ (Williams, 1982) do not mean by ‘self-contradictory’ blatant 
contradictions of the sort Bernoulli puts forward. I am inclined to agree with 
Gordon Belot, who in another context has recently written “[It] does not deserve 
to be called a theory precisely because it is inconsistent.” (2006, p.16). If 
Bernoulli’s position is a theory, ‘theory’ is being used in a rather peculiar sense. 
But even if we accept that Bernoulli’s justification counts as a theory, it isn’t 
clear that it deserves a place on the lists of ‘inconsistent scientific theories’ noted 
in §1. For example, the issue with Bohr’s theory of the atom – which also graces 
many lists of ‘inconsistent scientific theories’ – is how reasoning can continue, 
given ECQ (recall §2, above). A typical paraconsistent approach is presented by 
Bryson Brown (1992). But with the early calculus there is no such issue, since in 
practice there is no reasoning with the inconsistent theory in question. Rather, all 
the reasoning is done at the algorithmic level. Thus, no paraconsistent account is 
required to explain ‘how reasoning continues’; there is no work here for the 
paraconsistent logicians to do.16
To sum up, the situation is as follows. To identify a theory as inconsistent is 
all very well, but for that identification to be of any interest it must be clear that 
                              
16 Or very little. Jakob Bernoulli did propose at one point that infinitesimals could be 
adopted such that x+dx=x if one rejected the principle that ‘equals subtracted from equals 
give equals’ (Mancosu, p.238, Boyer, 1949, p.240). But this approach was never 
seriously pursued. 
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there is a genuine commitment to that theory by a relevant community. Now the 
inconsistency claim here is at the level of justification, whereas the majority of 
the commitment remained at the algorithmic level, so already the significance of 
the claim is significantly reduced. But then at the level of justification the actual 
commitments are better described as inadequate (not matching actual practice), or 
incoherent (invoking nebulous concepts such as ‘evanescent increment’). To 
bring the charge of inconsistency via Berkeley is to read selectively. As the 
passages already cited indicate, the take-home message of the The Analyst is that 
there is no adequate, coherent explanation of the calculus. Little doubt that even 
Berkeley would stop short of terming the calculus an ‘inconsistent theory’. 
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